[en] Full text: It is known that IAEA plays an important role in facilitation of nuclear non-proliferation as international authority which carries out nuclear inspections. Republic of Tajikistan in 1997 signed nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty. Then in 2004 Safeguards agreement, additional protocol and small quantity protocol were signed. During 5 years Republic of Tajikistan submits information on its nuclear activity as declarations, foreseen in article 2.3 of Additional protocol to Safeguards agreement. Currently 66 declarations are submitted. Information required in accordance with Safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol is figured on that IAEA could compile more detailed and exact conception about nuclear activity in Tajikistan and it has the following purpose: information will lead to more transparency, and make it possible to IAEA to ensure with high extent of confidence that in the framework of declared program, any unstated nuclear activity is concealed; the more exact and comprehensive information, the rare is questions and discrepancies are originating; required information is the basis for effective planning and IAEA activity realization, related not only with safeguards implementation in regard to declared nuclear material but also ensuring of confidence in absence of undeclared nuclear activity in Tajikistan. IAEA inspection mission consisting of Messrs. N.Lazarev and F. Coillou visited Dushanbe in 2008 for verification of republic’s declarations on account for and control of nuclear materials under Additional protocol and Small quantity protocol, as well as consultations were provided on correct declaration completing and providing information on all nuclear materials. Besides, in 2006, the training course was conducted in Chkalovsk with participation of Commonwealth of Independent States countries on Safeguards agreement and Additional protocol. These visits and events will facilitate to strengthening of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regime. For strengthening of nuclear materials non-proliferation regime it is necessary to: strengthen safeguards; more effective export control and efforts on black market network liquidation; effective activities on search of orphan sources; efforts exhorting demand reduce for nuclear weapons. For safeguards strengthening it is necessary to conduct annual IAEA inspections. Taking into account that Additional protocol provides to IAEA considerably more wide access to information and IAEA should make use of its privileges. Some countries signed Nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty but unfortunately didn't signed Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. That's why Additional Protocol should be ratified by all countries, which can be universal standard of nuclear inspection. Provider states should make Additional protocol as condition for license issuance on nuclear materials, services and technology export. Tajikistan provides necessary information to IAEA in accordance with Additional Protocol: location where nuclear material is available or might be available; information about all buildings where nuclear material could be available; ready to provide assistance for IAEA missions on environmental sampling; provides to IAEA inspectors multiple visas; information about scientific and research works. Exclusive importance for IAEA safeguards agreement is high safeguards culture. IAEA should regularly conduct seminars on advanced assessment of safeguards culture - exactly as recommends to nuclear sites regularly to assess safety culture, and to undertake steps on elimination of any revealed shortcomings. One of the important safeguards criteria is nuclear knowledge preservation. IAEA member-states should advocate initiative on attraction and next generation specialists training and provide them a stimulus to make a carrier in IAEA. Important safeguards element is more effective export control and efforts to liquidate black markets network. The experience with nuclear black market network, operating till liquidation during many decades approximately in 20 countries, clearly gives evidence that in order to control sensitive nuclear technologies and technologies of dual use and prevent operating illegal technology networks, it is necessary to undertake additional steps. One of the new instruments was United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which obliges all United Nations member states in juridical way to establish proper effective control over export, transit and trans-border transfer. It is necessary to establish proper effective control over export, transit and transboundary transfer by all states as it is required in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; expansion of assistance from IAEA in this regard, including development of standard legislation, broadening international cooperation and etc. The time has come that United Nations Security Council adopts new resolution on nuclear weapon non-proliferation, which could grant juridical ban on leaving from nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty.