[en] The K-Area facility at the Savannah River Site provides for the handling and interim storage of the United States' excess plutonium. Operations consist of plutonium storage in large arrays of shipping packages and surveillance capabilities that include various non-destructive analysis instruments and one glovebox. Through a philosophical shift and many technical improvements in the criticality safety documentation, the number of required controls has been significantly decreased. Up through 2016, a suite of criticality safety evaluations was in place for all of K-Area's fissile material operations. These nine evaluations established requirements for 315 credited criticality safety controls. Among these evaluations, there was a high reliance on quantitative frequency analysis to demonstrate that the frequency of a criticality accident was less than 10^-6/year. These frequency analyses were used as justification that a criticality accident alarm system was not needed. The large number of controls was a result of using quantitative frequency analysis as well as performing very detailed computational analyses that implied many details were important to criticality safety and must be controlled. Starting in 2014, a philosophical shift began to enable a change in approach for criticality safety in K-Area. The old approach determined how many controls were needed to quantitatively prove that the frequency of a certain upset event sequence would remain below 10^-6/year. The new approach determines which controls are needed to ensure that credible upset conditions will remain subcritical. During the same time, a new methodology was developed for assessing the need (or lack thereof) for a criticality accident alarm system. Instead of relying on quantitative frequency arguments, the new methodology assesses the aggregate risk of a criticality accident in the facility based on the nature of the fissile material processes and the complexity of operations, among other factors. This change in methodology enabled the abandonment of quantitative frequency analyses. In the past five years, the nine criticality safety evaluations have been revised, consolidated, or replaced altogether with new evaluations. These new evaluations employ more reliance on American Nuclear Society standards, handbook values, and hand calculation methods. These new evaluations rely less on Monte Carlo calculations and do not rely at all on quantitative frequency calculations. The result is five evaluations that contain a total of 100 controls, which is a reduction of 68%. At the same time, operational capability, throughput, and efficiency have been increased. In this paper, the philosophical change and technical improvements will be presented, and the resulting elimination of controls will be discussed. (authors)