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[en] The capacity market that the authors have proposed for New England avoids problems found in early capacity markets by only rewarding capacity that contributes to reliability as demonstrated by its performance during hours in which there is a shortage of operating reserves. This design both avoids and hedges energy market risk, and by suppressing market power also avoids regulatory risk
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Available from doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2005.07.003; Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
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[en] A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the forward procurement of reliability options - physical capacity bundled with a financial option to supply energy above a strike price. The market assures adequate generating resources and prices capacity from the bids of competitive new entry in an annual auction. Efficient performance incentives are maintained from a load-following obligation to supply energy above the strike price. The capacity payment fully hedges load from high spot prices, and reduces supplier risk as well. Market power is reduced in the spot market, since suppliers enter the spot market with a nearly balanced position in times of scarcity. Market power in the reliability market is addressed by not allowing existing supply to impact the capacity price. The approach, which has been adopted in New England and Colombia, is readily adapted to either a thermal system or a hydro system. (author)
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Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2008.01.007; Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved; Capacity mechanisms in imperfect electricity markets
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[en] Forward markets, both medium term and long term, complement the spot market for wholesale electricity. The forward markets reduce risk, mitigate market power, and coordinate new investment. In the medium term, a forward energy market lets suppliers and demanders lock in energy prices and quantities for one to three years. In the long term, a forward reliability market assures adequate resources are available when they are needed most. The forward markets reduce risk for both sides of the market, since they reduce the quantity of energy that trades at the more volatile spot price. Spot market power is mitigated by putting suppliers and demanders in a more balanced position at the time of the spot market. The markets also reduce transaction costs and improve liquidity and transparency. Recent innovations to the Colombia market illustrate the basic elements of the forward markets and their beneficial role. (author)
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Available from Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2010.05.004; Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved; Designing electricity auctions
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[en] Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets. (author)
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Available from Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2010.05.002; Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved; Designing electricity auctions
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