[en] This document presents the Convention SFEN 2012. The first day was dedicated to the the today status of the Fukushima plant, the remedial actions, the key lessons learned and the feedback experience on the accident management. A discussion has highlighted 4 strong ideas: -) in any case (even nuclear accident) no massive release of radioactivity must be allowed, -) the causes of the Fukushima accident were obviously underestimated, -) effort must be made on broader safety margins, and -) to reinforce the mitigation of the consequences of external aggressions. The second day was dedicated to the prospects of nuclear energy in Europe, in China and in the United States. It appears that even by including costs due to the implementation of new safety measures taken after the Fukushima accident, nuclear power stays the most competitive energy in France. (A.C.)

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[en] This series of slides focuses on expectations from NPP operators concerning key points and role of TSOs (Technical Safety Organizations) related to -) skills and competence, with the need for broad systemic views regarding safety issues, -) the whole licensing and regulatory framework, for an efficient safety management in a competitiveness context (the requirements must be clear, reliable, stable, timely and internationally aligned), and -) the harmonization and the standardization in the licensing process to foster nuclear renaissance

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[en] The safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is checked through different types of safety evaluations, for example, a continuous process, with followup of operational feedback and over-all evaluation every year by each NPP; specific examination, with the study of generic problems when they occur; and a 10-yr outage inspection. In France, the license does not explicitly require periodic safety reviews (PSRs), but an article has been added to the Decree of December 11, 1963 concerning nuclear installations that states, open-quotes The Ministers may jointly request the operating utility at any time to proceed to a review of nuclear safety,close quotes which supports requests for PSRs from the safety authority

[en] Analysis of incidents and accidents occurring at French and foreign power plants - particularly the TMI accident - and the commissioning of many units in France, as well as tests on simulators, have all demonstrated that an improvement of safety in nuclear power units depends largely on the improvement of the man-machine interface and particularly of emergency operating procedures (EOP). EDF has taken numerous actions in this direction, especially since 1979. First of all, in improving the classical approach based on event-oriented procedures: - Rewriting of initial accident operating procedures with regard to their technical content, their form, and the organization of the operating team (procedures I and A). - Extension of initial procedures into areas at the limits of design basis and beyond the design basis limits (procedures H)

[en] Short communication

[en] The lessons drawn from real reactor accidents are of great value. The safety approach in France relies on defence in depth and takes into account accidents in the plant design, completed by a probabilistic approach and experience feedback. Ultimate procedure are implemented on the basis of severe accidents studies which include core melting or partial containment defect, in order to mitigate their consequences even if they are improbable, and to enable a proper implementation of emergency planning countermeasures. The accident hypothesis and consequences are considered to draw the emergency planning procedures. Off site countermeasures, such as in house-confinement, limited evacuation or iodine distribution, are efficient in limiting the consequences for the public. Experience feedback, in association with a proactive vigilance and prevention policy, is developed in order to detect and correct in a proactive way the root causes of any deviation, even minor, so as to avoid multiple failures and ensure safety. (author). 4 refs., 2 figs., 1 tab

[en] How can a safety level be assessed. There is no single absolute and time continuous indicator, but rather an interrelated set of judgements which take into account: - the results obtained; the analysis of events; the use made of experience feedback to correct and prevent defects; - the undertaking of progress strategies to deal with the root causes, following experience feedback or results of internal or external audits, regarding operation or construction; - the anticipation and long term management and configuration control over the standardized NPPs, by maintaining and demonstrating a satisfactory safety level, taking into account possible aging effects, and by guaranteeing an efficient emergency preparedness for always possible crisis situations. The results obtained show that proper operating performance levels and the maintaining of a high level of safety are two objectives which may go hand in hand and reinforce each other in the long term, since they are both based on operating quality and vigilance. But only on one condition: that we base our efforts on a well-established and maintained safety culture, so as to foster questioning attitudes and correction of potential weaknesses, and to enhance openness and transparency, both internal and external, in dealing with safety matters. In the following, the main aspects regarding safety assessment of the EDF NPPs will be presented: operating experience and results, progress strategies undertaken, long term control

[en] In order to comfort its energy independence and diminish the amount of radioactive waste, France has chosen to close its fuel cycle since long. Thanks to the size of the fleet of reactors operating in France, reprocessing techniques have been validated on an industrial scale and France is now the only country to master these technologies. The French strategy of closing the fuel cycle allows, first, the vitrification of high-level radioactive wastes and their storing in passive installations before their definitive disposal and secondly, it allows the recycling of fissile materials. Several other countries like Japan, United-Kingdom, the Netherlands and China soon have also chosen to close their fuel cycle. Plutonium recycling is made through the fabrication of MOX (mixed uranium and plutonium oxides) fuel in the MELOX plant with an output of 120 tons a year. A second recycling of spent MOX fuel in PWR is unlikely because of the poor isotopic quality of the plutonium, the recycling will be possible and economically competitive in fast reactors when these 4. generation reactors take over. The important, complete and unique experience of AREVA in terms of fuel cycle from fuel fabrication to waste vitrification via plutonium recycling is a relevant asset in the competitive international nuclear energy market. (A.C.)