Cunningham, M; Dowla, F
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., Livermore, CA (United States). Funding organisation: US Department of Energy (United States)2004
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., Livermore, CA (United States). Funding organisation: US Department of Energy (United States)2004
AbstractAbstract
[en] We compare the performance of two methods of digital filtering to detect a radioactive source moving past a gamma-ray sensor. The first method is the box-car filter, which is a standard method used in the detection of a moving radioactive source. The second method is the matched filter, which takes into account the variation in the number of photons absorbed in a gamma-ray sensor as a source moves past the sensor. We optimize both methods to detect a source moving at 5, 10, 15 and 20 mph, and the receiver-operator characteristics of the two techniques are plotted for comparison. The improvement of the matched filter over the box car filter is 27% at 5 mph and 22% at 10 mph for a 90% probability of detection and an average hours between false alarms equal to 10
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28 Dec 2004; 0.2 Megabytes; W-7405-ENG-48; Available from PURL: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/15011424-X0kaLK/native/
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[en] Recent advancements in the ultra-wide band Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology and solid state pillar type neutron detectors have enabled us to move forward in combining both technologies for advanced neutron monitoring. The LLNL RFID tag is totally passive and will operate indefinitely without the need for batteries. The tag is compact, can be directly mounted on metal, and has high performance in dense and cluttered environments. The LLNL coin-sized pillar solid state neutron detector has achieved a thermal neutron detection efficiency of 20% and neutron/gamma discrimination of 1E5. These performance values are comparable to a fieldable 3He based detector. In this paper we will discuss features about the two technologies and some potential applications for the advanced safeguarding of nuclear materials.
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27 Jan 2010; 6 p; 2. Japan-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Safeguards Technology for the Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Tokai-mura, Ibaraki (Japan); 10-13 Nov 2009; W-7405-ENG-48; Available from https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/386040.pdf; PURL: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/972410-KKXwGY/; PDF-FILE: 6; SIZE: 0.6 MBYTES
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Nekoogar, F.; Dowla, F., E-mail: nekoogar1@llnl.gov
Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People. Book of Abstracts, Presentations and Papers2015
Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People. Book of Abstracts, Presentations and Papers2015
AbstractAbstract
[en] The ability to reliably and securely automate the monitoring of SNM is an important goal in Safeguards. Although item level monitoring of SNM requires both seal and tag technologies, the two technologies thus far have been developed more or less independently, and had been a lack of an integrated compact system. An integrated seal-and-tag approach not only aids inspectors to perform their tasks effectively, this approach also allows real-time inspection in large scale facilities. A typical facility could be the size of a large warehouse with hundreds or thousands of items that need to be sealed and monitored in real-time. Previously we reported on advanced secure RF passive (battery-less) tags with special features including, long-range interrogation of passive tags, communicating with passive tags with strong encryption and dynamic authentication features, and the ability to place the tags directly on metal objects. In this paper, we report on a novel secure passive tag integrated with fibre optics seal that allows real-time monitoring of items through secure wireless communications that employs AES encryption and dynamic authentication. Furthermore, the devices can be networked for large scale operations. The proposed passive seal has the same capabilities as active seals in that it allows realtime monitoring. However, the battery lifetimes of conventional active seals are limited or unpredictable. As the long-term storage of SNM might last for several years, these passive seals having been integrated with passive RF tags, extends the lifetime of the physical seals and tags indefinitely, while getting the same performance of active seals and tags. The integrated seal-and-tag is transformational in addressing a critical need in Safeguards area for long-term real-time monitoring. (author)
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); 491 p; 23 Mar 2015; p. 298; 12. Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People; Vienna (Austria); 20-24 Oct 2014; CN--220-278; S19--09; Also available on-line: http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2014/home/eproceedings/sg2014_eproceedings_online.pdf; S19: Advanced Technologies for Safeguards Communications
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