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Finon, Dominique
Institut d'economie et de politique de l'energie, CNRS-Universite Pierre Mendes France - UFR DGES, IEPE, BP 47, 38040 Grenoble Cedex 09 (France)1997
Institut d'economie et de politique de l'energie, CNRS-Universite Pierre Mendes France - UFR DGES, IEPE, BP 47, 38040 Grenoble Cedex 09 (France)1997
AbstractAbstract
[en] This paper examines the different ways of introducing competition in the electricity supply and its interest in terms of improvement of the structure of incentives in reference to the recent experiments of liberalization. The basic hypothesis is that the needs of technical coordination of the electric industry are the main source of the anterior vertical and horizontal integration. The present dramatic progress of the information and communication techniques allows a redefinition of the former structures in facilitating the establishment of coordination between decentralized agents to preserve the network externalities and to manage the system constraints. Nowadays the real problem is focused on the very complex definition of arrangements to organise efficient competition between generators, or between suppliers. Three key-points are developed: the organisation of the vertical and horizontal ownership arrangements (to which degree could we allow the firms present in the natural monopoly activities to be present in the competitive activities?); the rules structuring the arrangement in order to combine efficient short term coordination and the incentives of competition; the crucial role of a strong regulation to reach efficiency and price decrease. (author)
[fr]
Ce papier examine les possibilites d'introduction de la concurrence dans l'offre electrique et son interet en termes d'amelioration des incitations a la lumiere des experiences de liberalisation. On part de l'hypothese que ce sont d'abord les exigences de coordination technique de la filiere electrique qui fondaient auparavant l'integration verticale et horizontale. De ce fait le progres des techniques d'information autorise une recomposition des structures en permettant l'etablissement de coordination entre unites decentralisees pour preserver les externalites de reseau et gerer les contraintes du systeme. A partir de la, le probleme est renvoye a la definition complexe de bons arrangements de type concurrentiel. On traite alors de trois points-cles: l'organisation des decoupages et des liens entre niveaux d'activites horizontales (peut on permettre aux firmes situees dans les activites en monopole naturel d'etre presentes dans les activites concurrentielles?); les arrangements a constituer pour permettre une concurrence effective et rapprocher les equilibres de court terme de l'ordre de merite; le role central d'une reglementation forte pour atteindre a l'efficacite et a la baisse des prix. (auteur)Original Title
La concurrence dans les industries electriques: l'efficacite au prix de la complexite transactionnelle et reglementaire? - Cahier de recherche No.12
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Mar 1997; 29 p; 55 refs.; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses
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Finon, Dominique
Encyclopedie de l'Energie, Grenoble INP - Ense3, Ecole Nationale Superieure de l'Energie, l'Eau et l'Environnement, 21, avenue des Martyrs, CS 90624, 38031 Grenoble cedex 1 (France)2015
Encyclopedie de l'Energie, Grenoble INP - Ense3, Ecole Nationale Superieure de l'Energie, l'Eau et l'Environnement, 21, avenue des Martyrs, CS 90624, 38031 Grenoble cedex 1 (France)2015
AbstractAbstract
[en] As electric industries have been liberalised or privatised later than other public utilities, notably in developed countries, this article first recalls that this activity has been during a long time a monopoly hold by a public service, and precisely planned with tariffs regulated by public authorities. Then, the author explains how deregulation is performed for such an industry to allow competition to be introduced at all levels of the electric sector. He describes the operation mode of the wholesale market which is structured in an hourly market due to the non-storable characteristic of electricity, describes retail price formation by pilling up the wholesale price, regulated tariffs of transport and distribution, and a tax aimed at paying the cost of public policies. This price can be compared with the regulated tariff which previously encompassed everything without any dissociation. Finally, he highlights the main defects and drawbacks of this market which do not allow long term investments in base equipment, back up equipment and on low carbon equipment (renewable, nuclear, and others)
Original Title
La complexite des marches electriques: les limites de la liberalisation des industries electriques
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Dec 2015; 20 p; 6 refs.; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the 'INIS contacts' section of the INIS web site for current contact and E-mail addresses: http://www.iaea.org/inis/Contacts/
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Finon, Dominique
Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - CIRED, Campus du Jardin Tropical, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736 Nogent-sur-Marne Cedex (France)2014
Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - CIRED, Campus du Jardin Tropical, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736 Nogent-sur-Marne Cedex (France)2014
AbstractAbstract
[en] The Fukushima accident again raises the question of the social and economic viability of nuclear technology. On an international basis, it should be necessary to reach the maximum level of safety for every nuclear power plant (NPP) to avoid any further accident in order to preserve the acceptability of the technology. To obtain a significant orientation in upgrading safety standards in matter of NPP design and operation and institutional practices for control and safety in all countries with nuclear facilities, the ideal would be to succeed in setting up a binding international governance. This article examines the incentives and the conditions to achieve it. These incentives on the States appear not to be strong enough at the global level in order that they delegate part of their sovereignty in this domain. It seems that we must be content with a weak governance. This governance combining the role of the IAEA as a facilitator, and different peer pressures mechanisms at the level of the NPP operators, the reactors vendors and the safety authority. We observe that each of these mechanisms is presently being reinforced. But how strong this weak governance is strong enough? (author)
Original Title
Vers une gouvernance mondiale de la surete nucleaire contraignante: Une quete impossible?
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Jan 2014; 20 p; 21 refs.; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the 'INIS contacts' section of the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses: http://www.iaea.org/INIS/contacts/
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[en] The stake of investments is all too often underplayed in deregulation reforms focused on market roles and de-integration measures. The presentation criticizes first the optimistic approach of the theory of investment incentives through market signals when it is applied to deregulated electricity industries. The greater part of the investment in base-Load and peak equipment should be made profitable by income from very high price during peak and extreme peak periods. Next, there is a problem of political acceptability, as the wholesale prices may reach extremely high and often unexpected levels and the system may face risk of shortage in the period of needs of new capacities. The problem is then addressed in the context of the mature electricity industries in North countries. Given the maturity market, a number of corrective solutions of the pure market model could be envisaged to enforce the incentives to invest, but none of them is a perfect one. The main way is to focus on adaptation of market roles on the supply of power at peaks and extreme peaks by considering capacity adequacy as a public good (with three solutions: capacity payment, reserve obligations, centralized procurement by auctioning for peak capacity). The observation of reforms suggests also the validity of some other solutions based on a limitation of the competition by allowance for long-term contracts and vertical integration between production and supply. The Transaction Cost Theory gives a justification of the recourse to these ones. Observation suggests also another solution in opposition with the canonical approach of the competition, the regulatory tolerance for horizontal integration and smooth market power exercise, which implies a specific political culture to tolerate it. Finally the question is extended to the specific problem of developing countries characterized by irregular growth. It is argued that reforms must be designed in view of the importance of the investment stake through long-term co-ordination and reduction of investment risks. Indeed experiences of Latin American liberalized industries show that they have to include a number of competition-based imperfections and to allow ongoing exercise of market power for prices rising above competition prices. The Single Buyer model or some variants of it appears to be a good alternative if one wishes to avoid the twists and turns of the competition paradigm. The difficulty with this model rises from the institutional conditions to make it efficient and not over-costly
Original Title
Incentivos para la inversion en las industrias electricas liberalizadas del norte y del sur: La necesidad de arreglos institucionales adecuados
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Journal Article
Journal
Energetica (Medellin); ISSN 0120-9833;
; (32); p. 7-22

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Finon, Dominique
Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - C.I.R.E.D., 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)2012
Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - C.I.R.E.D., 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)2012
AbstractAbstract
[en] The Fukushima accident raises again the issue of the social and economic viability of nuclear technology. To re-evaluate this viability, we analyse the past process of internalisation of external costs of nuclear energy, which present the specificities to be chanted by accidents and has had a constant effect of complexification. This process has provoked a de-organisation of the classical learning process reflected in constant cost increases and the change of social preferences, to end up by the lack of competitiveness before climate policies. Independent institutions of safety regulation have become essential elements of the social embeddedness of nuclear technology at the expense of technology stability and standardization, condition of its competitiveness. In this perspective, the paper argues that the new sequence of social costs' internalization opened by Fukushima will have limited effects on costs, because of anterior steps of safety improvements. Nuclear technology complexification reaches its asymptote: it is being to overcome the challenge of 'learning by major accidents'. On the other hand nuclear institutions must be re-designed in such a way that it could guarantee maximum safety records and minimum residual risks by going to the other root of the safety issue, the degree of independence and capabilities of the safety authorities in every country, what cannot be decreed. It is nevertheless at this price that could be preserved the global public good of the social acceptance of nuclear technology by limiting drastically chance of new accidents. (author)
Original Title
L'economie du nucleaire revisitee. Lecons de l'apprentissage d'une technologie complexe par des accidents majeurs
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May 2012; 37 p; 46 refs.; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the 'INIS contacts' section of the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses: http://www.iaea.org/INIS/contacts/
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC IMPACT, ENERGY POLICY, ETHICAL ASPECTS, EXTERNAL COST, INVESTMENT, LIABILITIES, MARKET, NUCLEAR ENERGY, NUCLEAR INDUSTRY, POLITICAL ASPECTS, PUBLIC OPINION, REACTOR ACCIDENTS, RISK ASSESSMENT, SAFETY, SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS, TECHNOLOGY IMPACTS, TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION, WANO
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AbstractAbstract
[en] This book is a summary version of the content of a 3rd cycle thesis in the field 'Economics of Energy' presented at the Grenoble Social Sciences University, in March 1975. The optimization approach in the energy sector is briefly precized in view of clarifying the economic bases of the models. The field of action of the ENERGIE model is then defined, the decision structure and the specific situation of the French energy sector being taken into account. The principles of the model and the simplifying hypotheses for the representation and formalism of this sector are presented. The data and parameters used are defined with the results optimization
[fr]
Cet ouvrage est une version abregee d'un texte qui a fait l'objet d'une soutenance de these de 3eme cycle dans la specialite ''Economie de l'Energie'' devant l'Universite des Sciences Sociales de Grenoble en mars 1975. On y precise brievement la problematique des demarches d'optimisation du secteur de l'energie pour clarifier les fondements economiques de ces modeles. On delimite ensuite le champ d'action du modele ENERGIE, compte tenu de la structure decisionnelle et de la situation du secteur energetique francais. On presente les principes de construction du modele et les hypotheses simplificatrices de la representation et de la formalisation du secteur. On precise les donnees et les parametres utilises ainsi que les resultats des optimisations effectueesOriginal Title
Un modele energetique pour la France
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1976; 227 p; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Paris, France; ISBN 2222019028; 

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Book
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Finon, Dominique
Chaire European Electricity Markets - CEEM, Fondation Paris-Dauphine, Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 (France)2014
Chaire European Electricity Markets - CEEM, Fondation Paris-Dauphine, Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 (France)2014
AbstractAbstract
[en] Renewable energies are earmarked to take up a very significant share in the output of some of Europe's electricity Systems. The variability of their contribution makes the maintenance of the system's physical equilibrium a veritable challenge, once the share reaches a certain level. Apart from the necessary technical improvements, the transformation of the System first and foremost requires upgrading the way the different energy markets function
Original Title
Le besoin de marches de la flexibilite: l'adaptation du design des marches electriques aux productions d'energies renouvelables
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Dec 2014; 20 p; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the 'INIS contacts' section of the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses: http://www.iaea.org/inis/Contacts/
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Finon, Dominique
Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - CIRED, UMR 8568 CNRS/EHESS/ENPC/Engref/Cirad/Meteo France, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)2017
Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - CIRED, UMR 8568 CNRS/EHESS/ENPC/Engref/Cirad/Meteo France, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)2017
AbstractAbstract
[en] In the name of the low-carbon transition, a wobbly political compromise has led to an arbitrary sharing of the electricity mix without any economic or environmental basis, by reducing the share of the nuclear company in electric power production to 50 pc to make way for renewable energies to reach a share of 40 pc by 2030. Some have sought to give an economic rationality to this policy based on these two means targets based on two intuitions: the diversification value of the mix, a kind of option value of the choice to break the irreversibility effect of the nuclear choices in the 70's and 80's, and the option value of the choice to wait in the nuclear domain to avoid new irreversibilities. This paper 'de-knit' this reasoning by showing that it does not in any way respect the conditions of rigour of the reasoning of the theory of option values: to consider in detail the possible options, to identify precisely the uncertainties and risks attached to each of the options as well as those emanating from the context of each option, and to anticipate their effects of irreversibility. In the end, the way to pose the problem reveals an unfounded bias in favor of the economic competitiveness of intermittent renewable energies, a groundless denial of any possibility of economic mastery of the nuclear sector in high safety conditions, and an emotional approach to nuclear risk. The policy of decarbonization of the electric power sector based on 2030-2035 low-carbon technology market share targets, which pretends to open up future to limit risks, turns its back on all economic logic and leads to ignore the 'unexpected effects' of any large scale policy for the development of intermittent renewable energies
[fr]
Au nom de la transition bas carbone, un compromis politique bancal a conduit a decider d'un partage arbitraire du mix electrique sans fondement economique ni environnemental, en reduisant la part du nucleaire dans la production electrique a 50 pc pour laisser la place aux energies renouvelables pour qu'elles atteignent une part de 40 pc en 2030. Certains ont cherche a donner une rationalite economique a cette politique basee sur ces deux cibles de moyens en se reposant sur deux intuitions: la valeur de diversification du mix, sorte de valeur d'option du choix de briser l'effet d'irreversibilite des choix nucleaires des annees 70 et 80, et la valeur d'option du choix d'attendre dans le domaine nucleaire pour eviter de nouvelles irreversibilites. Ce papier 'detricote' ce raisonnement en montrant qu'il ne respecte en aucune facon les conditions de rigueur du raisonnement de la theorie des valeurs d'option: envisager de facon detaillee les options possibles, identifier avec precision les incertitudes et les risques attaches a chacune des options ainsi que ceux emanant du contexte pour chaque option, et anticiper leurs effets d'irreversibilite. Au bout du compte, la facon de poser le probleme revele d'un parti-pris infonde en faveur de la competitivite economique des ENR intermittentes, un deni sans fondement de toute possibilite de maitrise economique du nucleaire dans des conditions de surete elevees et une approche emotionnelle du risque nucleaire. La politique de decarbonation du secteur electrique basee sur des cibles de parts de marche de technologies bas carbone en 2030-2035, qui pretend ouvrir les futurs pour limiter les risques, tourne le dos a toute logique economique et conduit a ignorer les 'effets inattendus' de toute politique de developpement des ENR intermittentes a grande echelle. (auteur)Original Title
Le partage arbitraire du mix electrique francais entre nucleaire et renouvelables. Quelle rationalite economique?
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Dec 2017; 20 p; CIRED--2017-68; 16 refs.; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses
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Finon, Dominique
Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - Cired, UMR 8568 CNRS/EHESS/ENPC/Engref/Cirad/Meteo France, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)2012
Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - Cired, UMR 8568 CNRS/EHESS/ENPC/Engref/Cirad/Meteo France, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)2012
AbstractAbstract
[en] Apart from the UK where it has been widely discussed in the 2011 Electricity Market Reform, energy experts communities are still unaware of the impacts that carbon policies directly focused on the development of low carbon technologies produce on the electricity market regime. Public co-ordination with long term arrangements needs to be introduced as a substitute to long term co-ordination by the market. Indeed, the current market co-ordination makes carbon prices ineffective at orienting investors towards low carbon technologies: fossil fuel generation technologies are preferred because their investment risks are much lower in the market regime. So, in order to avoid delayed investment aiming at the decarbonization of electricity systems, a number of new market arrangements which lower the investment risk of these technologies are being selected by governments. But, as these low carbon equipments develop, long term co-ordination by the market for the other technologies (peaking units, CCGT) will fade away. That means that in the future, public co-ordination and planning will completely replace market players' decisions, not only for low carbon technologies, but for every capacity development. (authors)
[fr]
La communaute des economistes de l'energie et du climat n'est pas encore completement consciente des changements que les politiques climatiques focalisees sur les technologies bas carbone vont entrainer sur le regime de marche des industries electriques. De telles politiques doivent introduire une coordination publique forte, combinee avec des arrangements de long terme, coordination, qui se substitue a la coordination de long terme par le marche. Cette coordination par le marche est actuellement inefficace car elle ne permet pas au prix du carbone d'orienter les investisseurs vers les technologies bas carbone a cout fixe eleve. On montre que les technologies emettrices sont preferees a ces dernieres car la gestion du risque d'investissement est beaucoup plus aisee avec elles et que ce critere prend le pas sur celui du moindre cout marginal de long terme. Aussi, afin d'eviter de retarder la decarbonation des systemes electriques, les pays doivent adopter rapidement de nouveaux arrangements de marche qui diminuent radicalement le risque d'investissement en technologies bas carbone. Mais, au fur et a mesure que les equipements bas carbone tires artificiellement dans le marche occupent la majorite du systeme, les autres technologies flexibles (CCGT) et de pointe a combustibles fossiles et dont on a besoin ne peuvent plus se developper par le marche. En consequence, a long terme, coordination publique et planification vont completement remplacer les decisions d'investissement des agents decentralisees pour tous les equipements et pas seulement les equipements bas carbone, releguant le marche dans une simple fonction de coordination horaire dans l'exploitation des equipements electriques. (auteurs)Original Title
Institutions et transition vers des systemes electriques decarbones. L'invisible changement du regime de marche
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Mar 2012; 19 p; CIRED--38-2012; 17 refs.; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses
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Finon, Dominique
Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - Cired, UMR 8568 CNRS/EHESS/ENPC/Engref/Cirad/Meteo France, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)2017
Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Developpement - Cired, UMR 8568 CNRS/EHESS/ENPC/Engref/Cirad/Meteo France, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)2017
AbstractAbstract
[en] The author first outlines that the reduction of the cost of renewable energies does not result in a higher competitiveness for these energies, notably because of their variability, and that the development of storage techniques will not solve this issue of economic valorization. He also outlines that there is an economic optimum for the decarbonization with these low-carbon technologies for a given emission level per MWh or a given price of avoided ton of CO2, and that this reference to an optimum is forgotten when a target production by renewable energies is specified, such a specification being therefore economically inefficient. This means that an optimal share of varying renewable energy production is in fact much lower that the targeted share (80 to 100 pc)
Original Title
Les politiques electriques basees sur une cible d'ENR variables sont-elles rationnelles economiquement?
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May 2017; 10 p; CIRED--2017-62; 6 refs.; Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses
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