[en] The author draws on his experience to compare the Canadian and U.S. nuclear regulatory systems. The U.S. system is said to be legal and adversarial, while the Canadian system is said to be co-operative and collegial, but both do the same kind of work successfully. The Canadian system has changed a little since this paper was first written. Among the examples of regulatory issues mentioned are the introduction of computerized shutdown systems at Darlington, and the question of off-site operation of the SLOWPOKE Heating Reactor

[en] The Fast Flux Test Facility on the federal reservation at Hanford, Washington, has become a bright star in the universe of nuclear science and engineering technologies. The entire FFTF enterprise is now a success story, and this is particularly significant in these days when good news about nuclear power is scarce. The reactor, its testing capabilities and associated test facilities are described

[en] A description is presented of the design philosophy and safety features of the 975-MW(t) Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR), a sodium-cooled demonstration reactor to be built near Oak Ridge, Tenn. The overall safety of the plant is based on three levels of protection: (1) reliable operation through intrinsic features of the design, (2) protection provided against anticipated faults and unlikely events, and (3) provision for extremely unlikely events. The principal features of each of these three safety design levels are discussed. In addition, work is continuing on a parallel design approach that treats a core-disruptive accident as a design basis. (auth)

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[en] Probabilistic criteria based upon an acceptance measure of protection for owner investment can complete the range of design probabilistic criteria between those set by acceptance public safety and those set by acceptable reliability in plant operation. Criteria which address the protection of owner investment have the benefit of lowering risk in adjacent risk regions by providing greater reliability in operation as well as less risk to the safety of the public and the environment. Such investment protection criteria are currently being used to extend plant life but they could also be used very beneficially as part of the initial design process. In this paper trial criteria are suggested which address the risk of extended plant shutdown with the resultant necessity to purchase replacement power, and the risk of replacement of expensive plant components. Additional financial assessment is required to ensure that there is a proper correlation between acceptable measures of owner-investment protection and the levels of probabilistic defence suggested, but the trial criteria proposed can be used as important practical design criteria

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[en] The 1987 DOE budget continues its high priority for defense efforts and its de-emphasis of energy projects. The ratio of defense to commercial dollars went from the 1-to-1 ratio of the Carter budget to 3-to-1. The administration thinks commercial nuclear energy is mature enough for the private sector, with advanced reactor concepts best left in the military and space programs. There could be a heavy lobbying effort against this position. A new approach for non-nuclear programs will involve joint DOE/private-industry ventures in which industry will select the research and development projects on the basis of industry criteria and pay over half the costs. DOE will provide less than half the funding, as well as coordinate activities and disseminate information. In the authors analysis of the budget, he cites concerns about the advanced reactor and other programs under this approach

[en] Accidents are defined of various consequences and probability for use as design bases in the design of reactor safety systems. In the past a core disruption was used to set requirements for containment barriers of small LMFBRs. It now seems that the use of such a design basis accident has created a misplaced emphasis. Greater safety is to be provided by the provision of reliability assurance, that such an accident is of such low probability that it is inappropriate as a design basis accident, and greater emphasis should be placed on the basic protection against accidents rather than on the mitigation of presumed consequences