[en] The article deals with claims for damage of individual persons and of states after the nuclear incident of Chernobyl. Relevant are article 3 et seq. of the Paris Convention and section 25 et seq. of the Atomic Energy Act. States can claim damages from the Soviet Union by way of negotiation. Problems arise from the terms causation, extent of damage, jurisdiction and especially from the relationship to other states. (CW)

[en] According to the international atomic law principle of the so-called legal 'canalisation' of the responsibility to the owner of the nuclear plant, only and exclusively the owner of the nuclear plant is responsible, for damages resulting from nuclear events. The liability of other persons who have also contributed to the cause of the damage is strictly excluded (for example Paragraph 25, sed 1 Atomic Energy Act in connection with article 6 (a) and (b) of the Agreement of Paris). The author shows cases in which another person of German nationality (e.g. a supplier) can nevertheless be sued for damages. This could, e.g. be the case, if a German supplier delivered deficient goods to a nuclear plant in Brazil, and this delivery were to causes damage. (UN)

[en] In case of a foreign nuclear accident which causes damage within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, section 38 of the Atomic Energy Act grants compensation, provided the foreign law applicable to the incident concedes no or considerably less compensation than the German law. In ascertaining the facts the question of relations between damage and nuclear accident may be problematic, especially if the damage is caused by official directives. (WG)

[en] The existing regime of third party liability and financial security applicable in the FRG basically is an up-to-date and risk-adequate system of compensation for nuclear damage. This is particularly true since unrestricted financial liability has been introduced. The legal provisions offer adequate protection of interests of possible victions of a nuclear accident without inflicting unreasonable hardship on liable persons. The expert opinion discusses the limits, purposes and subjects of a possible amendment of the nuclear liability law, referring to items such as: principles of liability, financial security, commitment of the Federal Government; the concept of definition of damage, time limit to claims. Points of main interest for a future improvement are stated to be the yet unsolved strict liability problem, the organizational scheme of settlement of claims, and an international nuclear liability regime, the so-called system of risk pooling. (orig./HSCH)

[en] In this chapter the author recalls the circumstances of the adoption of the Paris and Vienna Conventions on nuclear third party liability and analyses the principles underlying their elaboration. The Chernobyl accident brought this conventional system into focus and the author questions these principles, in particular, the merits of the different limitations in the operator's liability: in amount, in time and in territory. He notes nevertheless that a Joint Protocol on the application of the Vienna and Paris Conventions was a desirable extension of this system and that a new instrument concerning the international liability of states would complete it usefully (NEA)

[en] The author investigates the legal consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Although a network of legal provisions concerning the utilization of nuclear energy had been in force before the accident at Chernobyl occurred, this event proved that there were still gaps in the system. The author deals with the efforts started in the aftermath of the accident in order to cope with the new situation. International organisations, especially the IAEA, played a leading role in tackling the formation of new legal regimes. (WG)

No abstract available

[en] The unexpected chance to re-unify Germany offered at the end of 1989 required the drafting and setting into force of the necessary legal instruments within a year. Those instruments were to aim at harmonising the social, economic and legal systems of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, with their differing political backgrounds, and diametrically opposite policy directions including nuclear law. The application of Federal nuclear law to the acceded part of Germany caused numerous practical difficulties. One main field of concern stems from the fact that the legal framework for unification provided for a continued validity of nuclear licences granted under GDR law in order to ensure the continuation of necessary nuclear activities. Major problems arise from the uranium mining activities and the ore processing plants operated by the former Soviet-German Company Wismut which caused wide-range radioactive contamination in Saxony and Thuringia. (author)

[en] Developing and implementing a national programme for the civilian use of nuclear energy means embarking on the use of a Janus-faced form of energy. We all know that nuclear energy implies both extraordinary benefits and extraordinary risks. This fact requires a legal framework appropriate to cope with both elements of nuclear power. Legislators and State authorities have to establish a sound balance between risks and benefits. That is not at all an easy task. While excluding or limiting risks requires severe legal control mechanisms, the benefits can only fully be enjoyed if the legal framework ensures freedom of research and of economic and industrial development including the guarantee of property ownership and of investments. Combining both opposite poles seems like trying to square the circle. In case of a conflict between promotion and protection, there is no doubt that the protection against nuclear risks has to prevail. Therefore this aspect of nuclear law will be mainly dealt with in this presentation. Establishing a legal framework to tame the hazards of nuclear energy is a much more challenging task for law-makers than providing a legal basis for promoting the use of nuclear energy. With regard to the promotion of nuclear energy, States enjoy a broad range of discretion and may use a great number of legal and non-legal instruments to support the development of a nuclear programme. From a legal point of view, promoting nuclear energy does not require a specific regime. However, it does require a specific regime to control the risks of nuclear energy. States preparing for a nuclear energy programme have to be aware that the use of nuclear energy is not an exclusively national matter. In particular the risk associated with nuclear energy extends beyond national borders. Using the benefits also needs international cooperation in many fields including, e.g., research or fuel supply. Today a network of multilateral and bilateral international treaties exists covering the prevention and mitigation of risk and damage as well as the promotion of nuclear energy. New nuclear States should be prepared to adhere to relevant international treaty regimes, as appropriate, and to implement them at national level.

[en] The article is a replication to the article by Gleim and Winter published in NJW 80, 1088, under the same heading. The author regards as an error in law the opinion expressed by those two authors that compact storage facilities for spent fuel elements cannot be licensed. If one assumed that spent fuel elements were utilizable radioactive residues in the sense of Sec. 9a, Para. 1, Subpara. 1 of the German Atomic Energy Act, their storage could ne licensed under Sec. 6 and Sec. 7, respectively, of the Atomic Energy Act. Even if spent fuel elements were considered to be residual materials which could not be utilized at the present time (i.e. radioactive waste), the storage of such materials was a way of disposing of radioactive waste for which permits could be granted. (IVR)