[en] The subject is reviewed under the headings: recent events; legal and political instruments; non-proliferation in a political context; security of supply; IAEA safeguards; the outlook. (U.K.)

[en] Safeguards approaches that include higher degrees of transparency at the level of facilities and at the level of the state also need a higher degree of transparency at the level of IAEA safeguards implementation. Here the author gives a brief discussion of: (1) confidentiality or transparency in the present approach; and (2) transparency in the alternative safeguards approach

[en] The term fuel cycle oriented approach is currently used to designate two quite different things: the attempt to consider all or part of a national fuel cycle as one material balance area (MBA) or to consider individual MBAs existing in a state while designing a unique safeguards approach for each and applying the principle of nondiscrimination to fuel cycles as a whole, rather than to individual facilities. The merits of such an approach are acceptability by the industry and comparison with the contemplated establishment of long-term criteria. The following points concern the acceptability by the industry: (1) The main interest of the industry is to keep an open international market and therefore, to have effective and efficient safeguards. (2) The main concerns of the industry regarding international safeguards are economic burden, intrusiveness, and discrimination. Answers to these legitimate concerns, which retain the benefits of a fuel cycle oriented approach, are needed. More specifically, the problem of reimbursing the operator the costs that he has incurred for the safeguards must be considered

[en] The IAEA has now 200 Inspectors or so, and Euratom a similar number. People in Vienna are talking about increases of this staff, in the range of a possible doubling in the five years to come, although even an immediate restart of the expansion of nuclear industry, would not materialize significantly within this period. This means that keeping the same safeguarding approach would probably lead to another doubling of such staff in the ten following years, which is completely unrealistic. Such a staff is our of proportion with those of national inspectorates in other fields. The paper analyzes the basic irrealistic dogma which have hindered the progress of international safeguards, and recall the suggestions made since ten years to improve them

[en] To tentatively form the CrO₂ compound, different experiments were carried out by means of a monomode microwave apparatus. In this way, Cr₂O₃ powder was either mixed or superimposed with either Cu₂O or MnO₂. Indeed, such oxides should release oxygen because they are reduced to metallic copper or manganese sub-oxides, respectively, during exposure to the electromagnetic beam. The final results of the experiments were, in fact, to synthesize binary oxidized chromium compounds, which are difficult to form according to the usual thermodynamic procedures

[en] If the necessary distinction between categories of plutonium is made, and if the possibilities open by the 93+2 program are fully implemented, it should become possible to implement in the framework of the Cut-off Treaty, as well as in the framework of the NPT, a safeguards regime, fully non-discriminatory as far as the peaceful nuclear industries of NWS are concerned, with an amount of resources not significantly higher, if at all, than the one globally devoted at present to international safeguards. Such a regime could concentrate the inspection effort on really weapons-grade materials (be they separated or not), and the means to produce them, without neglecting non-weapons-grade materials such as reactor-grade plutonium or 19% uranium, but keeping the inspection effort at the level appropriate to the relatively lower risk they represent. But I am afraid all my paper is out of context of what is being actually discussed in this seminar. If I understood correctly, what many of us are after is to determine how we could make cheap safeguards for safeguarding the Cut-off, while keeping costly safeguards for the NPT. I am sorry, but personally I have no interest in discussing such an issue. If cheaper safeguards are less effective, I see no reason why we should apply them to India, Israel, and Pakistan. If they can be as effective, as I believe is the case thanks to the new Protocol, I see no reason why they should not be applied, as well, to NPT signatories

[en] Published in summary form only the paper recalls the principle of resonance photoionization, transition probability, selectivity and critical parameters. Examples of applications are briefly treated: Trace analysis by resonance ionization mass spectroscopy for detection of Fe in Zr F₄ for fabrication of optical fibers and laser isotopic separation of U 235 and Gd 157

[en] The laser induced fluorescence technique has been used to analyze the HFS of the 0-16512 cm^-1 transition. The hyperfine constants for the 16512 cm^-1 level have been measured and the signs of the hyperfine constants for the ground level have been determined, showing that A<0 and B>0, confirming the calculations of Kronfeld et al (4)

[en] An attempt is made to eliminate certain misunderstandings about the concepts of unpredictability of inspections and unannounced inspections. Analysis of paragraph 84 of document INFCIRC/153, which deals with unannounced inspections, shows that even in theory such inspections are hardly feasible and in practice would probably be ineffective for international safeguards. Rather than attempting to carry out unannounced inspections, it seems more useful to attempt to reduce the period of advance notice of inspections. At present, most inspections performed by the Agency are done according to a schedule and procedures which the State can predict a year or more in advance. If such inspections were predictable only within the period of advance notice and that period were short enough, they could be regarded as largely unpredictable for the State in the sense that it would be very difficult at such short notice to adapt any diversion scenario to the actual inspection schedule and procedures. With resources of a given level, the choice lies between covering: (1) a limited number of diversion routes with a high probability of detection; (2) all feasible diversion routes with a lower probability of detection; or (3) all feasible diversion routes with a variable and unpredictable probability of detection. The last solution is considered as being the one which creates for a State the highest possible detection risk for a given inspection effort. Unannounced inspections are unrealistic. However, it is important that advance notice by as short as possible. Even more important is unpredictability of the inspection programme over the year. (author)

[en] On May 11th, the NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed by consensus on three resolutions, one of which noted that there was a majority for the indefinite extension of the treaty. The two others were dealing with disarmament, and the strengthening of the review process. The Review Conference as such did not succeed in adopting a final document, but published the draft reports of its Main Committees, one of which is dealing with international safeguards. This paper deals briefly with the decisions and statements made about non-proliferation policies. It will thereafter analyze the positions adopted about international safeguards, namely with respect to the 93 + 2 IAEA program, the safeguarding of the Cutoff Convention, and the implementation of safeguards in Nuclear-Weapons States. The likely consequences of such decisions and positions on the future implementation of IAEA safeguards will be analyzed