[en] A Florida Power and Light Co. study and demonstration of automated system control to manage nuclear plant outages and reduce downtime found the system improved reaction to problems and shortened the length of outages for refueling. The use of PROJECT/2 at Turkey Point improved early warning, interdepartmental planning, and support estimates. The study established a reduction in manpower needs, operating costs, and refueling days. It also identified some areas for plant improvements

[en] The tax treatment of decommissioning costs is as important a consideration as construction costs. The principles also apply to offshore operations and pipeline systems having a negative salvage value. Estimates place the cost at somewhere between 15 and 100% of construction costs, depending on how the decommissioning is done. It is essential to find an accurate way to project decommissioning costs and to decide how they should be reported for tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not plan to apply Section 167, which deals with negative net salvage. Utility customers will ultimately provide the funds, but current IRS rulings count these funds as ordinary income and do not allow matching the additional revenue with decommissioning expenses

[en] Rate adjustments to accumulate the capital needed to decommission nuclear power plants require complex cost estimates that must be accurate, plant-specific, and defensible. The radioactive nature of the facility makes it more difficult to estimate decommissioning than construction costs. Of the decommissioning methods, safe storage (SAFSTOR) and entombment (ENTOMB) are interim solutions, with dismantlement (DECON) taking place after 30 to 100 years. This analysis shows DECON to be the least expensive over the long term and the most attractive. New technical knowledge and more stringent industry standards call for periodic adjustments of the cost estimates, which now have only a periodic escalation for inflation. This results in understated costs. 3 figures

[en] The author feels that, with electric demand growth of 4.5 to 5% per year expected, it will be only a matter of time before stepping-up the stream of utility capacity additions becomes an important issue. If demand grows 4.5% per year instead of 2.8% as projected by NERC, demand will be 10% higher and peak reserve margins about 12 percentage points lower than envisioned by the NERC projections after five years. By 1988 or 1989, little or no excess capacity will remain, and the utilities will be faced with adding twice as much capacity annually as now planned to avoid service deterioration. As questions about the adequacy of current utility capacity plans and concerns about service quality move toward center stage, the antinuclear movement should find it increasingly difficult to garner the broad support it now enjoys. Capacity represented by any uncompleted nuclear plants will appear increasingly beneficial, and those who do not have strong antinuclear sentiments should become increasingly hesitant about lending support to the movement. Accordingly, electric demand growth in due course can be expected to drain marginal supporters from the antinuclear movement and thereby erode the movement's vitality

[en] The Westinghouse Electric Corporation announced in September, 1975, that it would not honor commitments to deliver to US and Swedish utilities nearly 65 million pounds of uranium. The fallout from this default is only now beginning to reach electric ratepayers, as the units for which this uranium was committed now come on line and their costs enter the rate base. This article summarizes the events leading to the Westinghouse default, the ensuing litigation, and current circumstances in the uranium market. 1 figure, 1 table

[en] The author modifies and extends the argument presented in the September 22, 1983 issue by Richard E. Nellis for using economic depreciation to allocate nuclear power plant costs. The two goals of his model are to charge constant real costs to consumers and to provide a fair return of .125 to investors in each period. The addition of other objectives requires further modification of the model since the schedule of revenues that are deemed to be optimum defines the depreciation schedule. 1 table

[en] Some elements of the Japanese nuclear program would not be likely to be as successful in the United States. The different nature of government-industry relations and the very different approach to developing plans in the United States does not tend to produce as unified an approach. The US political process makes it difficult to achieve the long-term stability in research programs that nations such as Japan can have. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the direction of the Japanese nuclear program and their determination to proceed in this area. It may be useful to examine some of the things they have done for possible inclusion in US systems. It may also be attractive to continue or even expand joint efforts with them in some areas. Particularly in the case of costly programs such as the breeder reactor, a joint effort might permit the United States to sustain a greater research effort for a given investment than would otherwise be possible, although issues of potential competition would also have to be addressed

[en] States' rights arguments were at the center of Mississippi's unsuccessful suit against the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act in which Mississippi claimed government intrusion into state regulatory functions through a congressional act. States' rights will be central to two new California suits in which state nuclear-power-moratorium laws invade federal jurisdictions. Details of the Mississippi case are examined to see if the court's interpretation applies in the California cases. At issue is the extent of state power to regulate public utilities

[en] An epic struggle in the US Congress between what the author calls the forces of transcendence and the forces of experience over development of a breeder reactor for electric power generation is described in this article. The project was started by President Nixon, survived repeated attacks under President Carter, and ironically succumbed under a strong supporter, President Reagan, as a result of an unlikely coalition of conservative organizations and Republican politicians. The broader meanings of the demise of the Clinch River project are examined on several levels, examining the significance for the nation's energy future and for the nation's political future

[en] The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission recently agreed to consider permitting a phased recovery of nuclear plant costs as a means of moderating the abrupt increase in rates caused by traditional rate-making treatment of newly constructed plant. This article discusses the mechanics of three types of plan and their reception by state regulators: 1 post-in-service date rates base phase-ins, 2 staged rate increases spanning the latter years of construction and the early years of operations, and 3 ''negatives'' or ''mirror'' construction work in progress