[en] This paper proposes a scheme for the management of network congestion in the Internal Electricity Market (IEM) of the European Union. This scheme tries to combine the rigor in the treatment of the energy and transmission capacity transactions with the flexibility and pragmatism that are necessary to make the scheme compatible with the current diversity of regulatory approaches and market structures in the Member States participating in the IEM. First, a reference scheme is presented with a complete formulation that jointly deals with the energy and capacity markets. Because of the implementation difficulties of this conceptually ideal approach, a more pragmatic scheme is proposed instead. The core of this scheme is an explicit auction mechanism that must be run prior to any short-term (daily, typically) energy markets. In this auction, where only transmission capacity is traded, both bilateral contracts and energy bids to Power Exchanges can participate in order to acquire the capacity that is necessary to carry out their transactions. Some technical issues related to the practical implementation of the proposed approach are also examined; these include market liquidity, the financial or physical nature of the long-term contracts, the potential problems of 'slicing' transmission capacity and the allocation of congestion rents. Market power issues are ignored. (author)

[en] Congestion on power grids seems a physical reality, a 'hard' fact easy to check. Our paper models a different idea: congestion signal may be distorted by transmission system operators (TSOs). Indeed, congestion signals are not physical data but 'home made' conventions directly set by the TSOs in charge of the security of the system. These security norms are not stable and invariable because lines capacity limits are not constant. TSOs, therefore, define the congestion signal on a variable, complex and non-transparent constraint and may manipulate it for monetary purposes or for other personal agenda. In Nordic countries the coexistence of two congestion management methods in a 'Light Handed Regulation' framework makes this opportunistic behaviour even more likely. (author)

[en] Governments planning reform of their country's electrical power sector frequently receive recommendations to move in a single step to a market with a compulsory pool and a single buyer. In many developing and emerging economies such a first step is likely to carry an unduly high risk of failure for a range of technical, economic, legal and political factors. This paper arises from a consultancy project in Guangdong Province, China, and proposes a sequence of reform which includes two intermediate steps to be completed before the introduction of a compulsory pool: (1) efficiency improvements and cost reductions with no market and (2) a transition wholesale market. (Author)

[en] Quantitative analysis of 47 US investor-owned electric utilities' environmental exposures to impending air quality and climate policies shows potentially material and highly differentiated financial impacts. For many companies the minimized compliance costs of a four-pollutant cap-and-trade regulatory regime would be less than those of a three-pollutant regime that omitted controls on carbon dioxide emissions. Fragmented regulatory requirements would have the highest compliance costs. The companies studied vary considerably in the adequacy of their financial reporting of these potential impacts. Greater transparency would benefit investors and the most favorably positioned companies. (author)

[en] The purpose of the Asian Development Bank Report was to investigate and study the energy infrastructure development of western industrialized nations along with their impact on the environment. Then there could be an analysis of how IMAR could ''leapfrog'' or jump over the mistakes of the west and create an energy infrastructure for itself and China. The report reflects and summarizes this historical energy infrastructure development over the 20th Century. The five countries were the UK, Germany, S. Africa, USA and Australia. The foreign energy advisors felt that there were two additional elements that needed to be included. First was the fact that the USA as a whole was different than its regions or states, particularly California. So the nation-state of California was added. Secondly, the western nations of Germany and S. Africa in particular, had carefully considered some advanced coal technologies that were ''cleaner'' than the traditional and conventional approaches to mining. Both nations developed these ''clean coal'' technologies that are now being used more and more today in other developed nations like the USA. If IMAR was to retain much of its coal production and reduce it over time, then it had to install these technologies now to reduce global warming and reverse the climate change caused by current coal mining. (author)

[en] The energy sector in Bulgaria has undergone major restructuring in recent years. It faces the dual challenges of achieving regulatory stability to attract private investors, and creating a functioning competition energy market. As of the EU Accession in 2007, Bulgaria has fully liberalized power and gas markets. The 2003 Energy Law establishes the energy sector legal framework and sets the basis for creation of a transparent and predictable regulatory environment where the key regulatory responsibilities are vested with the State Energy and Water Regulatory Commission (SEWRC). The energy sector experienced significant problems in the first half of 2007 due to lost production capacities and regulatory failures on the electricity market. Excess price regulations on the market of electricity supplies to household, coupled with insufficient liberalization of imports and exports, create unfavorable conditions for power producers and large electricity users. The energy regulator has tried to achieve several incompatible targets as of July 1, 2007 for maintaining low electricity prices for households in response to political pressure, low power generation prices amid rising input costs, and market opening in compliance with EU regulations. (author)

[en] Turkish electricity reform has progressed slowly due to internal resistance against privatisation, and gained momentum after Electricity Market Law of 2001, prepared in line with EU Energy Acquis and established required institutional and legal framework. Although the eligibility threshold has reached 39% market opening rate, the dominant position of public both as owner and decision-maker is still the major problem in the sector. Currently Turkey is self-sufficient in electricity, but likely to face shortages in 10 years if the growing demand is not met by either speeding the liberalisation process, or joining the South East Europe Electricity Market. (author)

[en] Efforts to stimulate market competition in gas suffer from two fundamental problems. High transport costs sharply limit the number of competing suppliers in any market and the industry has strong natural monopoly elements in portions of its delivery system. Government policy approaches in the USA, Canada, the UK and the continental EC have featured 'open access' pipeline transportation to link competing buyers and sellers. Because of regional differences, however, progress towards an ultimately workable system and the prospects for its success are very different in the four regions. (author)

[en] The Pacific Enterprises - Enova (PE-Enova) merger may be viewed as an example of the new breed of gas and power 'convergence' mergers. The merger involved the combination of a large gas distribution utility and a contiguous gas and electric utility located in Southern California. As with most mergers, the PE-Enova merger was proposed to federal and state regulators as an opportunity to achieve ratepayer savings. However, the merger also presented an issue of vertical market power involving the substantial electric generation capacity served by Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) and its potential impact on electric market prices, and the associated revenues for generation assets owned by San Diego Gas and Electric (SDGandE). In order for the merger to proceed, the approval of at least five separate State and federal regulators would be required. Although much of the attention of state regulators, proponents, and intervenors surrounded the division of synergy savings between ratepayers and shareholders, the analysis of the potential for market power abuse was extensive. Intervenors presented numerous complex arguments regarding the potential adverse effects of the merger on competition. In particular, intervenors argued that the combined company would manipulate its storage and transport operations to influence the delivered price of gas to California generators, and therefore, the price of power in the wholesale electric market. The arguments surrounding the existence and impacts of market power in this case are of interest in the understanding the nature and complexity of factors that may be considered in evaluating mergers. The proceeding also provides insight into how regulators are grappling with market power issues associated with convergence mergers, and weigh merger costs and benefits

[en] The aim of this paper is to challenge the widely held view that electricity privatisation in Great Britain (comprised of the markets of England and Wales, and Scotland) was beneficial simply because the price of electricity has subsequently fallen in real terms. This is carried out by comparing the electricity prices actually observed with those that might have been charged had the industry remained in public ownership. In order to do this the paper develops a counterfactual scenario for the likely decisions and effects of a publicly owned industry. This leads the paper to conclude that observed prices are indeed significantly higher than they would have been had privatisation not occurred. (author)