[en] The document reproduces the texts of the enclosures of the note verbale of 19 June 1998 received by the Director General of the IAEA from the Permanent Mission to the IAEA of Japan concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. The enclosures give information on Japan national holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel, as of 31 December 1997

[en] The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States

[en] The CTBTO Prep Com is overseeing the rapid establishment of the verification-related means for the future CTBTO. It encourages support and participation in its development and would like to ensure that ancillary benefits are identified and utilised. One such benefit is to be derived from the global expertise, data and information which are developed and generated through its activities. This is particularly so in the field of seismology where the rapidly developing field of engineering seismology is dependent on quality data over an extended period. A national seismological capability is essential for countries that wish/expect to develop rapidly in the next few decades. Tremendous benefit can be derived by utilizing the verification-related monitoring data and information products of the CTBTO Prep Com, by making the organization (International Cooperation Section) aware of all national seismological needs and by interacting with member states. A regional co-operative programme or structure could be of benefit to countries to link with the CTBTO Prep Com in Vienna or for addressing problems common to a region. There are a number of regional organisations in Africa that can house or provide some form of support to further the cause of envisaged regional co-operative endeavours. The terms of reference and mechanisms by which the regional endeavours will operate should preferably be set up by the participating states within each region

[en] The document reproduces the texts of the enclosures of the note verbale of 18 May 1999 received by the Director General of the IAEA from the Permanent Mission to the IAEA of Switzerland concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. The enclosures makes available figures for its national holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel, as of 31 December 1998

[en] The treaty covers renunciation of nuclear explosive devices, peaceful nuclear activities, prevention of testing of nuclear explosive devices, prevention of dumping, control system for verifying compliance, reports and exchanges of information

[en] International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.)

[en] The existing treaties are no substitutes for a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As for the time being such a treaty appears to be unattainable a low-Threshold Treaty as an interim step should become the aim of the scheduled bilateral as well as the on-going multilateral negotiations. Since in the view of experts low yields have no or only little military significance such a treaty may serve in the meantime as a provisional means both to prohibit as much as possible the development of new nuclear weapons and to prevent circumvention of the NPT by rewarding compliance with the treaty. Provided that the UN quest for general and complete disarmament continues to be the ultimate goal in international politics, peoples will then have to reinforce their efforts to claim the ultimate conclusion of a comprehensive test ban even against the lack of political will of the big powers. (orig./HSCH)

[en] In contrast to India, Pakistan is many years away from becoming a commercial nuclear supplier. Pakistan's nuclear technology and industrial base is dwarfed by India's, and even by those of smaller Asian nations such as South Korea and Taiwan. In the face of an embargo by advanced suppliers, Pakistan is still struggling to attract bids to supply equipment for the Chashma nuclear power project---some twenty years after starting the Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP), Pakistan's first and only power reactor import to date. This paper focuses on four sets of questions about Pakistan that could shape its potential role as a future nuclear supplier: transactions in the international nuclear market; structure of decision making in nuclear affairs; norms that guide its domestic and international nuclear policies; and capabilities for nuclear export

[en] The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs held two meetings of experts in Dagomys, USSR, entitled ''After Reykjavik: Planning for the Nineties'' and ''Verification of Arms Limitation Agreements''. The first meeting, 8-12 June 1987, focused on three major topics: conventional weapons (including regional agreements, reduction and elimination of conventional weapons, confidence-building measures, and verification); nuclear weapons (including reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, cessation and banning of nuclear tests, establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, and prevention of nuclear war); and international security and outer space. The second meeting, held 11-15 April 1988, examined the multilateral aspects of the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The 35 experts from more than 20 countries participating in the meeting discussed the conceptual issues and the technical aspects of verification. The list of participants in both of these meetings are included. 3 figs

[en] The revised Nuclear Reactor Control Law will go into effect on May 26. To enforce the revised law, modifications should be made to the following orders of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry: (1) rules relating to the business of refining of nuclear fuels, and raw materials for nuclear substances, and (2) rules relating to installation and operation, etc., of practical nuclear reactor for power generation. In response to a report submitted by an expert group under the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, the implementation of the following measures have been made mandatory; (1) establishment of zones for nuclear substance protection, (2) monitoring of the zones, (3) control of people getting in or out of the zones, (4) management of nuclear substances, (5) maintenance and inspection of equipment for nuclear substance protection, (6) improvement in the liaison system, (7) management of information on nuclear substance protection, (8) education and training of employees, (9) improvement in the system for nuclear substance protection, and (10) establishment of a system for response to emergency. (N.K.)