[en] The paper reviews the procedures followed in South Africa, as a Host State, in connection with visits by nuclear ships, from the preliminary legal considerations through to the eventual acceptance of normal commercial visits on a substantially routine basis. Aspects discussed include bilateral agreements and internal legislation, safety criteria, safety assessment, harbour procedures and costs. The importance of establishing quantitative acceptance criteria is emphasized

[en] Evaluation of the fuelwood and alternative energy sources project for central America's rural household and industry is presented. 4 tabs

[en] Using nuclear power as a form of propulsion for sea-going ships is not new. From the 1950's, beginning with a brief mention of submarines, the first western nuclear-powered US-built ship M/S Savannah decommissiond in 1970 after only 8 years following economic problems, the report explains the development of nuclear-powered vessels. The icebreaker Lenin marks the beginning of the Soviet development. Ice braking is an excellent utilization of nuclear power, during which fuel consumption is high. Problems of refuelling and calling in foreign ports are alleviated. The USSR contacted Waertsilae Marine, Finland, a specialised icebreaker builder, to develop a shallow-draft icebreaker. As a result, the first nuclear-powered icebreaker was constructed by Waertsilae for the Soviets. The Soviet Arctic is the only area where nuclear propulsion has proved both technically and economically feasible. 1 fig

No abstract available

[en] This paper assesses the efficient forest biomass technology in groups of direct combustion, charcoal-making and gasification for application in developing countries. Other technologies, such as briquetting, biogas and alcohol distillation, are not covered. 7 refs, 7 tabs

[en] This paper examines the results from the post-defueling radiation inspections of decommissioned 1950's vintage Soviet nuclear submarines. Exposed gamma doses from various areas of the reactor comprtment are presented, and lessons learned for future decommissioning activities are discussed

No abstract available

[en] At the end of the 6th session of the Third UN-Conference on the Law of the Sea an Informal Composite Negotiating text has emerged. Art. 19 ICNT, which defines innocent passage, contains no express limitation on nuclear shipping, while Art. 23 presupposes that nuclear ships have this right, provided they carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established by international agreements. A certificate of nuclear safety pursuant to Chapter VIII of SOLAS must be recognized by contracting states and coastal states may require liability coverage. Coastal state lack competences to regulate design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships or to impose requirements which have the practical effect of denying innocent passage. The right of passage also prevails in the special economic zones and in archipelagic waters

[en] The adequacy of current contingency planning by Federal and State authorities to deal with the accidental release of ionizing radiation from visiting nuclear powered or armed vessels in Australian waters and ports is reported on and 39 recommendations are made. After introductory chapters, the remainder of the report consists of two parts. Chapters 3 to 10 deal with the main issues relating to nuclear powered warship (NPW) visits and the adequacy of current contingency plans. Chapters 11 to 13 deal with the question whether any specific planning is required for visits by nuclear weapons capable warships. In part one the present emergency arrangements and criticisms of the current plans are reviewed. The NPWs' reactors, safety records and visit arrangements in other countries are discussed. The validity of the reference accident on which current NPW emergency planning is based is assessed. In part two nuclear weapons and their accidents are reviewed. The dissenting report of one of the Senators is included

[en] This article reviews new information about nuclear weapons accidents from official and unofficial sources, especially that relating to American orders to local military commanders to consult with allied officials on plans to respond to nuclear weapon accidents. It concludes by reviewing the policy implications of these revelations and the record of the Senate enquiry on the hazards of nuclear capable warships for Australians