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[en] Key points of the National Programme: • Radioactive Waste Management is to be carried out within German national responsibility and disposal is to be on German territory. • Disposal facilities are to be established at two sites: • Konrad facility for waste with negligible heat generation (commissioning expected in 2022, operation for 40 years); • Disposal facility for, in particular, high level waste according to Site Selection Act (site to be determined by 2031). • Dismantling of NPPs and other nuclear facilities is to be executed in due time so that arising LILW can be emplaced in Konrad facility
[en] Developing a Step Wise Approach to Waste Management and Decommissioning at Sellafield Ltd: • Understand the challenge; • Understand preferred direction of travel; • Characterisation - enabling waste led decommissioning; • Engaging stakeholders; • Focus on the true drivers - alternative ILW approach; • Alternative ILW approach - simplification of waste handling process; • Manage future challenges; • Fit for purpose transport package for decommissioning wastes; • Risk based management framework
[en] Conclusions: • Requirements, design and stepwise data freezes need to be performed in a safety case that is developed in parallel with design optimization and operational readiness activities. • The design is currently being optimized for industrialization and operation and large-scale demonstrations will also take place. The handling of changes and new information arising from these activities is a major challenge in the safety case process. • A change management process is essential to incorporate changes in a controlled way, so that their long-term safety impacts are properly assessed. The proposed changes need to be considered holistically, including the impact not only on long-term safety but also on the overall management of uncertainties. • As deviations (“planned” vs. “as built”) cannot be excluded completely, an analysis of their potential impact on long-term safety is needed.
[en] Our task was to assess waste retrieval operations from a typical RADON-type historical waste storage facility during decommissioning. Challenges: “Historical radioactive waste” is generated without a complete traceable characterization programme or quality management system in place. Key characteristics of historical waste are: — may be conditioned, partially treated, or raw; — poor or no information/traceability; — cannot conclusively identify originating process/location; — waste streams may be mixed. Conclusions: • SAFRAN uses methodologies agreed upon at the international level, namely, by IAEA standards; • Several experts can work more effectively when performing the same safety assessment. SAFRAN makes it easier to exchange experience through sharing projects and data bases; • It is helpful for systematic and structured safety assessment as per safety standards; • It manages information and data in the same software environment. • SAFRAN can play a significant role in managing records and knowledge on radioactive waste, nuclear facility site, characteristics of geological environment and safety barriers. • It can provide reliable long-term storage and effective management of safety related records for the purposes of safety reassessments, review and supervision.
[en] Conclusions: • Final disposal in deep geological repository (national, regional or multinational) is planed: → Implementation of disposal after NPP closure (>2065). • The strategy principle of international cooperation: → National responsibility for radioactive waste and spent fuel management is considered in parallel with active participation in international regional efforts to make progress in connection to joint regional programmes on disposal. • Implementation is challenging but technical feasible. • Timely and appropriate “nesting” of multinational solutions into national plans. • Although a multinational repository is likely not ripe for development today, actions taken now can be important to increase the likelihood of its future development
[en] Challenges in general today: ― Retrieval of waste: acceleration of planning work; ― Emergency preparedness: best possible implementation; ― Stabilisation of the old mine; ― Influent saline solutions: assurance of permanent disposal; ― Upholding dialogue: continuing the communication process with concerned region
[en] Summary/Conclusion Safety Case & 10 CFR Part 61: • Safety Case is an integrated approach to risk assessment and risk management. • NRC staff explicitly added “the safety case” concept in the ongoing amendment of 10 CFR Part 61, at the direction of Commission. • Plain language description the safety arguments and evidence to demonstrate the overall safety of a land disposal facility were developed. • It describes all safety relevant aspects of the disposal site, the design of the facility, and the managerial control measures and regulatory controls to inform the decision whether to grant a license. • It includes the same type of information that the original 10 CFR Part 61 required to be submitted as part of a license application (i.e., 10 CFR 61.10 – 10 CFR 61.16). • The safety case will be updated over time as a new information is gained during the various phases of the facility’s development, inspection, and operation. • 10 CFR Part 61 SC is quite consistent with IAEA SSG-23 with more detailed technical analysis.
[en] Conclusion: • Reading the WAC for the repository will give guidance not only on what is allowed and in which amount but also on what needs to be documented; • Based on a Repository WAC a strategy to achieve allowed characteristics for the waste can be developed to ensure safety during the waste processing and disposal; • Characteristics that in some way are described in the disposal WAC is worth collecting information about; • If a waste form is not present declaring it as zero will make a clear statement instead of leaving the information field blank, in particular later on in the repository lifetime; • A Waste Type Description can only be as good as the Disposal WAC allows – but collect all info that is available even if it is not asked for yet; • Small reflection – don’t try to fit all waste into one WTD – it will only create more work than you really want
[en] Conclusion: • Large stocks of legacy radioactive waste exist, which do not comply with the requirements of the Konrad repository. • Requalification campaigns with thousands of waste packages have successfully been carried out. • Quality assurance plans contain all necessary steps of specific (requalification) campaigns and optimize the procedures for each campaign in advance. • When sophisticated measurement equipment was needed an iterative procedure was adopted. Repeated evaluations of the nondestructive res. destructive measurements limited the measures to the necessary limit.
[en] Key conclusions: ◆ “The NUMO pre-selection, site-specific safety case” provides the basic structure for subsequent safety cases that will be applied to any selected site, emphasising practical approaches and methodology which will be applicable for the conditions/constraints during an actual siting process. ◆ The preliminary results of the design and safety assessment would underpin the feasibility and safety of geological disposal in Japan.