[en] A properly organised market for electricity requires that some information will be available for all market participants. Also a range of generally available modelling tools are necessary. This paper describes a set of simple models based on published data for analyses of the long-term revenues of regional utilities with combined heat and power generation (CHP), who will operate a competitive international electricity market and a local heat market. The future revenues from trade on the spot market is analysed using a load curve model, in which marginal costs are calculated on the basis of short-term costs of the available units and chronological hourly variations in the demands for electricity and heat. Assumptions on prices, marginal costs and electricity generation by the different types of generating units are studied for selected types of local electricity generators. The long-term revenue requirements to be met by long-term contracts are analysed using a traditional techno-economic optimisation model focusing on technology choice and competition among technologies over 20.30 years. A possible conclusion from this discussion is that it is important for the economic and environmental efficiency of the electricity market that local or regional generators of CHP, who are able to react on price signals, do not conclude long-term contracts that include fixed time-of-day tariff for sale of electricity. Optimisation results for a CHP region (represented by the structure of the Danish electricity and CHP market in 1995) also indicates that a market for CO₂ tradable permits is unlikely to attract major non-fossil fuel technologies for electricity generation, e.g. wind power. (au)

[en] Economic regulation of firms with market power has placed increasing emphasis on incentive-based regulation such as price caps. The move to such regulation often coincides with a change of ownership, making it difficult to separate the incentive effects. We focus on the effect of regulation alone by analysing the imposition of price cap type regulation on both publicly and privately owned Spanish electricity generators in 1988, several years before three was any change of ownership. Our initial results indicate that the publicly owned generators are generally more efficient than the private ones, but that the effect of price caps is to increase the efficiency of private sector plants faster than those in the public sector. We introduce two novelties into the analysis: we incorporate levels of CO2 and NOx emissions; and we include declared plant availability as an output. The outcome is dependent on the choice of inputs and outputs, and we argue that our measures are more appropriate than traditional measures for a system of central despatch for generators facing environmental constraints. (au) 37 refs

[en] The introduction of competition in electricity and gas markets has necessitated the creation of new markets, power pools and financial markets. Such markets are well known from other industries (e.g. oil) but have not been applied for the gas and electricity industries during the monopoly era. To which extent can market design applied elsewhere be transferred to gas and electricity and to which extent must they be modified? The interest in new market designs has recently been extended to environmentally goals, but existing policies to encourage them are considered inefficient and a burden for the state budget. This conference brings some of these subjects into focus. (au)

No abstract available

[en] The British government has decided to abolish the 'Pool', the electricity spot market in England and Wales, and replace it with a series of bilateral markets. The government believes that the Pool has been biased against coal-fired generators, and that its price-setting rule (all generators are paid the bid of the marginal unit) has inflated the level of prices. In practice, many of the perceived problems in the Pool are the result of market power, not the basic design of the Pool, which is capable of sending the right price signals to generators. Efficient bilateral markets could well produce similar results. Prices could rice, however, if buyers are more risk-averse, and less good at trading, than sellers. (au)

[en] The opening of Nord Pool in 1996 seriously constrained the power companies' ability to exercise market power within their national borders. Currently there is an integration process going on among the power companies in the Nord Pool area. It manifest itself in terms of take-over and reciprocal acquisition of shares in the power companies - nationally and abroad. This process may undo what the introduction of the common power market achieved in curtailing market power. The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects on market power of increased cross- ownership in the Nordic power market. (au)

No abstract available