[en] This standard is to be applied to components made of metallic materials, operated at design temperatures of up to 673 K (400⁰C). The primary circuit as the pressure containment of the reactor coolant comprises: Reactor pressure vessel (without internals), steam generator (primary loop), pressurizer, reactor coolant pump housing, interconnecting pipings between the components mentioned above and appropriate various valve and instrument casings, pipings branding from the above components and interconnecting pipings, including the appropriate instrument casings, up to and including the first isolating valve, pressure shielding of control rod drives. (orig.)

[en] These structural engineering guidelines concern planning, design and outfit of high-protection shelters resisting a pressure of 3 bar. They apply to both new buildings and to modifying existing cellars into high-protection shelters. High-protection shelters, hereinafter referred to as shelters must, according to the provisions of these guidelines, qualify to resist air blast effects and air-induced earth shock, falling debris, initial reactivity and fallout, fire damage, biological weapons and chemical agents for a long period of time. (orig./HP)

[en] In unit 2 of NUKEM facility shall be processed, used and stored: - 6 000 kg of U-235, natural and enriched uranium (0.7 up to 94% U-235), - 200 000 kg of depleted uranium, - 20 000 kg of thorium. This unit consists of: - Main building for production and storage (building 1). - Annex with laboratory, measuring stations and rooms for social life (building 2). - Storage facility for radioactive scrap (building 3). - Cooling water supply station (building 4). (orig./HP)

[en] The RSC state that the systems and components which are required for fuelling and for the zero-energy tests will be available after prior testing and ready for operation. They consider the THTR-300 in the status described before appropriate for performance of the zero-energy tests. They have no safety objections against the still remaining work being carried out (i.e. on the water-steam-cycle, or on auxiliary systems). Altogether, concerning the safety system guidance, the RSC state that they have no objections to the design and starting of these systems, if their demands on the control systems, the power supply, the lightning protector and the protection against undue manual intervention are satisfied. (orig./HP)

[en] The RSC dealt with the safety to large fractures of live steam and feed water lines with the safety containment. They were informed by the plant deliverer about lay-out, calculation, load collective, working material, manufacture, fracture mechanics aspects, operational influences, in-service non-destructive tests, and leakage monitoring. Owing to the applied quality-increased measures and in consideration of the planned in-service tests and leakage monitoring large fracture can be excluded. As mathematical basis the RSC consider the assumption of a subcritical rupture with a leakage cross-section of max. 0,1 F as sufficiently conservative. The extent of the repeated tests to be carried out with non-destructive methods and the selection of the places to be used for the testing are to be fixed in accordance with the achieved state of quality. (orig./HP)

[en] The RSC states that, considering the given recommendations and subject to successful completion of pre-operational functioning and approval tests, no objections can be raised from the point of view of safety engineering against the commissioning of Gundremmingen unit II. Subject to successful completion of the zero-power and power tests in unit B, the RSC will approve the coming into operation of unit B. The RSC takes it for granted that the experience gained in the commissioning of unit B will be considered in the commissioning of unit C to follow about 8 months later. The RSC will raise no objections against the commissioning of unit C subject to successful completion of pre-operational tests with this unit. (orig./HP)

[en] The Reactor Safety Commission concluded that from the safety engineering point of view there are no misgivings about granting a licence under atomic energy law for away-from-reactor storage and operation of the transport container store at Ahaus and Gorleben. (orig.)

[en] This recommendation is to replace para. 21.2 of the 3rd edition of the RSK guidelines for PWR-type reactors of October 14, 1982 (supplement Nr. 19/82 of the Bundesanzeiger 69 of April 14, 1982). RSK-guidelines for PWR-type reactors: Leaks and ruptures in main-steam pipe of feedwater pipe respectively to be presumed. (orig.)

[en] The Muelheim-Kaerlich nuclear power plant (KMK) is an advancement of the Babcock and Wilcox (BandW) reactors presently under construction or in operation in the USA. It was designed in compliance with German safety requirements expressed in recommendations, guidelines and regulations which is reflected for instance in the general outlay of the plant, in the quality of components, in the degree of automation of the plant in the principle of de-network of safety systems, in the consequent separation of operational and safety systems, and in the design of the control rooms. As a result of RSK consultations, improvements and optimizations have been implemented while licencing was in progress. These improvements and optimization will lead to far lower response levels for pressure-reducing devices. The RSK summarizes that, taking into account this recommendation, they have no misgivings about the commissioning and operation of the Muelheim-Kaerlich nuclear power plant. They have no misgivings either about safety concept for the plant. (orig.)

[en] The radiation protection guide issued by the Strahlenschutzkommission (SSK) presents recommendations referring to nuclear facilities and the limitation of radiation exposure and radioactivity release, which are summarized here for reprocessing plants with an annual through-put of 350, 700 or 10 000 tons: 1) As a result of radiological studies and on the basis of the current state of scientific and technical knowledge of the retention and final disposal of various radionuclides, maximum permissible annual activity release rates are given for release via waste air (air path - α and β aerosols, I-129, Kr-85, T, C-14) and for release via effluents (water path - T, α-emitters, activation and fission products without T and α-emitters). 2) the SSK holds that, in order to meet the requirements of section 45 of the Radiation Protection Ordinance, provisions for retaining Kr-85, T, and C-14 released from a reprocessing plant of the above-mentioned capacity are not necessary. 3) Considering worldwide release and distribution, the SSK recommends that a suitable procedure for Kr-85 retention and disposal be developed to technical maturity. (orig.)