[en] Since 1994 an informal group of representatives of States party to the NPT has been trying to develop agreed international guidelines for the responsible management of non-military plutonium. This paper gives a brief description of the outcome. Since the results are still subject to decision by Governments, the description must be in general terms only. The paper describes the background to, and genesis of, the discussions and the general approach taken, which was based on commitment to the NPT, national responsibility for the management of nuclear materials and the fuel cycle, upholding of the IAEA's safeguards system, and a focus on civil material. An indication is given of the development of the Group's thinking, especially the decisions that any guidelines must be capable of accommodating surplus military plutonium, as well as civil, and that the main focus should be on measures to increase transparency. The resulting guidelines are described. Their main features are a re-statement of commitments and standards for the management of non-military plutonium with regard to non-proliferation, safety, and other fields, a commitment to the management of such plutonium according to a consistent national strategy, and a commitment to the publication of information on that strategy, and of annual statistics for holdings of plutonium in a consistent format. Other aspects of the guidelines are also explained. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the possible practical effects of the guidelines if adopted by governments. (author)

[en] In response to the changes in the international geopolitical scene, the United States and Russia have embarked in new directions regarding their nuclear weapons stockpiles. Both countries have entered a period in which significant numbers of nuclear weapons are being withdrawn from their stockpiles and dismantled. Large quantities of materials usable in weapons, including plutonium, are no longer required for defense purposes. On January 14, 1994, U.S. President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin issued a statement on ''Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Means of Their Delivery,'' in which the Presidents endorsed the goal of irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions and asked their experts jointly to ''study options for the long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of plutonium, taking into account the issues of nonproliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic factors.'' This paper traces the development of international technical cooperation on disposition of Russian weapons-grade plutonium, since disposition of Russian high enriched uranium is already being addressed by downblending into low enriched uranium for nuclear power reactor fuel. Development of options for disposition of plutonium has been addressed by diplomatic contacts between U.S. and Russia, followed by discussions and studies of disposition options by technical experts. This process has evolved into a recently-developed program of small-scale technology demonstrations that will support design of pilot facilities for disposition of plutonium. Experience gained in the operation of the pilot facilities will permit the design of full-scale plutonium disposition facilities to achieve irreversible disposition of plutonium as envisioned by the U.S. and Russian Presidents in their January 1994 statement. For this pressing problem, there remains technical work to be done, there remains political work to be done, and there remains financial work to be done. (author)

[en] The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

[en] Two door integrated entry control portals (booths) have become a common technique for entry control processing. Generally the systems have evolved such that one can virtually guarantee proper identification of a user as well as operate without security inspector support except in the event of an alarm. Such portals are of use in nuclear facilities. It is intended that this paper provides a guideline for security personnel obligated to specify entry control systems. The authors intend to tabulate all known available assessment capabilities and additional features which might be valuable to the user. Further ways to minimize the cost of a portal without significantly compromising security and productivity values are examined

[en] The increase in emphasis on the adequacy of the NMC and A internal control systems requires that management define what type of training and experience is needed by NMC and A Internal Audit Program. At Martin Marietta Energy Systems, inc. (the prime contractor for the Department of Energy at Oak Ridge, Tenn.), the Central NMC and A Manager has developed a comprehensive set of NMC and A Internal Audit policies that defines performance standards, methods of conducting audits, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate independence for NMC and A auditors, structure for standardized audit reports and working papers, and a section that addresses the development of training plans for individual NMC and A auditors. The training requirements reflect the unique combination of skills necessary to be an effective NMC and A Internal Auditor- a combination of the operational auditing skills of a Certified Internal Auditor, the accounting auditing capabilities of a Certified Public Accountant, and the specific technical knowledge base associated with nuclear materials. This paper presents a mechanism for identifying an individual training program for NMC and A auditors that considers the above requirements and the individual's long-range career goals

[en] Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

[en] This paper reports on ORIGNATE a personal computer program that serves as a user-friendly interface for the ORIGEN-S isotopic generation an depletion code. It is designed to assist an ORIGEN-S user in preparing an input file for execution of light-water-reactor fuel depletion and decay cases. Output from ORIGNATE is a card-image input file that may be uploaded to a mainframe computer to execute ORIGEN-S in SCALE-4. ORIGINATE features a pulldown menu system that accesses sophisticated data entry screens. The program allows the user to quickly set up an ORIGEN-S input file and perform error checking

[en] Many nuclear facilities manually remove and package, or bagout, radioactive materials from a glove box. Up to four operators are involved in removing the can and sealing it in a plastic bag, sealing it in a second can and placing it on a cart for transport. This paper reports that a major objective of the Secure Automated Canning and Identification Task (SACIT) is to provide protection from an insider threat at bagout stations where nuclear materials are vulnerable to diversion and substitution. The SACIT system consists of a robot system, an inner glove box transfer device, a shrink wrap heat ring, specialized robot end effectors, supervisory computer systems, and an operator's control station. The robot performs functions such as removing and weighing the can, separating the bagged can from the rest of the bag after it is sealed, transferring it into a second can, and setting up the application of a shrink wrap seal to the second can. The computer performs real time monitoring of the robots movements while screening the operator's input for validity and safety

[en] This paper provides a review of the design, implementation, and operation of the INEL Human Reliability Program from January 1984 through June of 1986. Human Reliability Programs are defined in terms of the ''insider threat'' to security of nuclear facilities. The design of HRP's are discussed with special attention given the special challenge of the disgruntled employee. Each component of an HRP is reviewed noting pitfalls and opportunities with each: drug testing of applicants and incumbents, psychological evaluation by management, security clearance procedures and administration including the use of an Employee Review Board to recommend action prior to final management decision

No abstract available