[en] In the fiftieth year since the first and only use of nuclear weapons in war, the evidence of actual progress towards the elimination of such weapons is decidedly mixed. The statement of the Pugwash council involves the following issues: agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world; reduction of proliferation risks; monitoring, control and reducing arms trade, transfer and production; global governance as a cooperative activity of states and non-governmental organisations to address the questions of global security; security in the Asia-Pacific region; and energy-environment-development interactions

[en] The fiftieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb is a crucial date on which to accelerate the trend towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. It is important that the Hiroshima bomb would be internationally condemned and that the US government accepts the responsibility for it. This would be the first step towards a declaration that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal. If this first step could be achieved, one might look with more optimism at the non-proliferation regime. Although it seems Utopian to free the world from nuclear weapons, all efforts must be made to reach the goal by the beginning of the next millennium

[en] In order to reach zero nuclear weapons, the role of nuclear weapons must change. As long as nuclear weapons are seen as an important factor preventing war, their continued existence will be assured. This does not mean that the nuclear-weapon-free world will not occur or that intermediate steps towards zero are not important. In the past five years the world has seen agreements to sharply reduce the number of warheads, significant progress towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and renewed support for the Non-proliferation Treaty including several surprise new members. The next five years will probably bring the world closer to nuclear-weapon-free world

[en] The elimination of nuclear weapons will require success in three interrelated efforts: stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons by states through indigenous programs; preventing the illicit acquisition o warheads, components or essential materials by states, sub-national organizations or individuals; and halting further production and eliminating existing nuclear weapons in acknowledged nuclear-weapon-states and in other states that may now possess such weapons. The elimination of nuclear weapons is a challenge for regional and global security and perhaps more than any other security issue, a matter of most appropriate for collective control measures. The most significant issues concerning control are related to proliferation and peaceful uses of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The IAEA has a special role, tasks and responsibilities concerning verification of non-proliferation, plutonium management, illegal trafficking of plutonium and/or highly enriched uranium, production cut-off of fissile material

[en] Even though strict legislation exists in many countries, it appears that the next few years should be a golden opportunity for groups to successfully monitor and publish the activity of the nuclear states, and human right violations through use of the Internet. The reasons for this are: 1. The Internet is becoming widespread even in repressive regimes; 2. Software is available to either hide messages from others or hide the mailers account; 3. Information from sites in other countries can be easily obtained to be read inside repressive regimes from the Internet. In this regard It is suggested the Pugwash or a similar organization should set up either an anonymous account to receive information or maybe use a more heavily protected cyperpunk remailer. Such an ability would hopefully prompt more people to notify treaty violations

[en] The Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty decided on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and adopted two documents 'principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' and 'Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty'. In the former document, the Conference encourages the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the conviction that such zones will enhance global and regional peace and security. Besides the Rarotonga Treaty, ASEAN countries plan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South-East Asia

[en] Paper discusses a concept of step-by-step utilization of nuclear submarines in Russia. By the late 2000 minimum 160 nuclear submarines with over 300 nuclear reactors should be removed. Unloading of spent nuclear fuel from reactors, dismounting of nuclear submarines, efforts to arrange storage facilities for liquid and solid radioactive waste are the main steps of nuclear submarine utilization. Under the rates of nuclear submarine utilization being as they are, the utilization of 160 nuclear submarines will take about 30 years. Paper analyzes the alternative variants of nuclear submarine utilization and discusses the social and ecological aspects of utilization of nuclear submarines

[en] This book has grown out of a research project dealing with political and technical challenges to international nuclear material and technology controls. The project, which was carried out in the period 1997-1999, was made possible through financial support from the Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology and, after reorganization of the German Government following the September 1998 elections, from the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Our research project was a co-operative effort linked to a joint Working Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation, sponsored by the German Society for Foreign Affairs (DGAP, Berlin) in collaboration with the Research Centre Juelich (FZJ, Juelich). The working group, a long-standing institution under the chairmenship of Professors Wolf Haefele and Karl Kaiser, is a unique undertaking for the purpose of continuous information exchange, intellectual debate and political consensus formation on all aspects of German nuclear nonproliferation policy. Members of the group comprise leading experts and decision-makers from government and politics, the natural and social sciences, engineering and nuclear industrial enterprises, as well as mass media and the specialized press. Many among them have shaped and executed the Federal Republic's nuclear policies in a variety of responsible positions. (orig.)

No abstract available

[en] Each year, the IAEA recruits a group of highly qualified specialists to join its experienced international team of safeguards inspectors. Their work will take them to nuclear facilities around the world, to utilize instrumentation and gather information for verifying national pledges that nuclear activities and materials under IAEA safeguards are exclusively used for peaceful purposes, and in those States which have signed a protocol in addition to their safeguards agreement, they will provide assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials. Under more than 220 safeguards agreements with 139 States, the IAEA has served as the world's nuclear safeguards inspectorate for the past four decades. The Agency carries out verification activities at more than 900 facilities worldwide, conducting about 2200 inspections a year. Before the new inspectors take to the field, however, they enter the classroom - participating in an extensive series of IAEA training courses, workshops, and seminars. The courses comprehensively cover the nuclear fuel cycle, the IAEA's safeguards role and responsibilities, and the skills and competence that safeguards inspectors need to do their jobs effectively and efficiently. Once on the job, training reinforces the evolving safeguards mission. Under the Agency's 'enhanced' safeguards training curriculum, experienced inspectors participate in seminars and courses designed to upgrade their skills and keep them fully informed of safeguards developments with respect to, for example, legal responsibilities, technological capabilities, and inspection procedures. The enhanced curriculum was developed in response to the IAEA's increasing safeguards responsibilities. The system has been strengthened in many ways since 1991, particularly for detecting any undeclared nuclear material and activities that should have been declared by a State under its safeguards agreement. This article presents an overview of the IAEA's safeguards training activities in the context of measures to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system